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Institutional implications of the rise of a debt-based monetary regime in Europe  
Fernando Losada     
 
This article deals with the institutional implications for the European Union resulting from debt relations. It 
suggests that despite original efforts to tame them, as a consequence of a series of events both in the 
international monetary order and the European integration process, power games lying behind debt 
relations have finally sprouted –with special virulence after the great recession. Although the causes have 
been brewing for a long time (in this regard the end of the monetary order established at Bretton Woods 
and the liberalisation of capital movements have been key factors), it is only in the post-economic crisis 
context that concrete examples of debt-based power games are observable in the institutional system. In 
hindsight, a line can actually be drawn tracing a transformation in the principle underlying EU constitutional 
law and its institutions: from promoting equality among its Member States to reflecting their (now 
persistent and increasingly divergent) economic power.   
 
I.- Introduction 
It is common knowledge that money is a means of exchange, a unit of value and a store of wealth. But as 
economic historians and sociologists have shown, monetary orders tend both to reflect power relations 
while being a major factor in shaping their transformation. In a nutshell, monetary orders are a key lever of 
power.1 This is so not only of national, but also international and cross-national monetary orders. Despite 
the implicit and sometimes explicit assumptions of most EU scholars, European integration is no exception 
to this rule.  
Awareness of how debt shapes relations among EU states has increased since 2007, but confusion still 
abounds in terms of the dynamics of debt relations and their impact on the structural and substantive 
constitutional law of the European Union. This article focuses on the relationship between the international 
monetary order and European integration. In particular, it considers how as a result of a series of events on 
these two fronts debt relations and their associated underlying power asymmetries have finally come to 
explicitly pervade the institutional system of the European Union, originally inspired by the principle of 
formal equality between states but presently reflecting Member States’ economic power. Two deeply 
interconnected dimensions, the politico-economic and the institutional, are therefore examined in parallel 
along the process of integration, although special attention is devoted to post-crisis institutional 
developments.  
To a considerable extent, debt owed to creditors established in other states, regardless of it being public or 
private (what in economic terms is known as ‘external debt’), determines relationships between states.2 
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Thus, not only public debt, but also private debt is relevant, if only because the risk associated with private 
cross-border debt relations may end up involving states, as guarantors of last resort of debtor and creditor 
financial institutions. In these debt relationships the balance in the power game between creditor and 
debtor depends on the degree to which the given state keeps control over trade in goods and services, over 
capital movements, over the currency and over the terms of indebtedness.  
In what follows, three different (even if deeply interrelated) types of external debt are distinguished: (1) 
debt stemming from commercial, non-financial cross-border activities; (2) debt resulting from cross-border 
financial flows; and (3) obligations between or among states (resulting from loans or reparations). Quite 
clearly, the first and the second type tend to be deeply intertwined in present practice. However, it is 
important to distinguish between them, if only because the power associated with external debt is heavily 
dependent on the extent to which states can effectively control and steer cross border capital movements 
and retain monetary sovereignty. Combining free movement in goods and services with controls on capital 
and coexisting national currencies, as was the case in the original European Communities, in the long run 
tends to level off the very same trade in goods and services. This is so because of the impact that a deficit 
or a surplus will have on the exchange rate of the national currency, and of the difficulty in perpetuating 
deficits or surpluses in the absence of freedom to provide loans across borders. Persistent trade deficits 
over many years are only possible if they come hand in hand with cross-border financial flows, thus 
creating long-term debt relationships. In addition, states may opt to seek external funding when issuing 
their sovereign bonds. As long as states retain control over the legal status of their bonds (issuing debt 
governed by national law) and over the issuance of money, an element of balance remains in relationships 
between creditors and debtors. Even so, creditors may require a state to renounce those elements as a 
condition for the issuance of credit. Finally, debts between states were characteristically the product of 
reparations, of military alliances, or of quasi-colonial relationships. The post-war Bretton Woods order 
envisaged a multilateral framework that aimed implicitly at rebalancing the position of creditors and 
debtors (as part of the transformation of the terms of international trade). However, in a very marked 
fashion since the seventies, international practice has resulted in the conditionality attached to official 
loans turning into a massive instrument to suspend the capacity of the debtor state for self-government. 
This article, while tracing the development and expansion of debt relations during European integration, 
will lead to the conclusion that a similar evolution has taken place in the European context.   
II.- The original treaties: a design neutralising debt relations 
During the first decades of integration, international monetary stability was guaranteed by the Bretton 
Woods system, according to which the dollar was directly convertible into gold while exchange rates 
between all other currencies were fixed, although revisable if required.3 The IMF was available to provide 
financial assistance in the event of economic shocks that could not be solved via exchange rate 
adjustment.4  
In this context of exogenously guaranteed monetary stability, the specific design enshrined in the Treaty of 
Rome assumed that national economies would be open to competition and engage in the construction of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
K. Dyson, ‘Norman’s Lament: The Greek and Euro Area Crisis in Historical Perspective’, (2010) 15 New Political 
Economy 597-608, at 600-603. 
3
  M. D. Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview’, in M. D. Bordo and B. 
Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform 
(University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3-98, at 49. 
4
  Article V, Section 3, IMF Articles of Agreement. 
common market to result in liberalisation of the movement of goods and services, and which would lead to 
full political and economic union in the long run. Meanwhile, Member States retained competence over 
macroeconomic policies, albeit they were to be coordinated on a European scale, a task placed in the hands 
of what would become the ECOFIN, with the help, in terms of monetary policy, of a merely consultative 
Monetary Committee (Articles 3(g) and 105 EEC Treaty). Moreover, they were required to maintain their 
balance of payments in equilibrium and to promote confidence in their national currency (Article 104 EEC 
Treaty) so as to avoid currency fluctuations, which might artificially alter competitiveness within the 
common market.  
In this framework, economic integration mainly referred to the free movement of goods and only current 
payments were allowed (Article 67 EEC Treaty). Both the European Payments Union and the Bretton Woods 
system were premised on the assumption that full liberalisation of capital flows undermined economic 
stability. In this regard liberalisation was a long-term task, to be decided only after institutional and 
substantive convergence allowed recreation at the European level of the socioeconomic and political 
conditions which ensured that free movement of capital was not an economically and politically disruptive 
force.5 Capital movements were accordingly supposed to be restricted and under strict scrutiny.6 If, despite 
all these safeguards, exceptional but severe difficulties in the balance of payments of some particular 
Member State should arise, the Treaty foresaw the means to ensure containment of crises and 
preservation of equality among Member States. States experiencing difficulties were to be assisted, if 
necessary by credits granted by the Communities (Articles 108 and 109 TEC); if those credits were not 
granted, they were at least allowed to activate ‘safeguards’, thus limiting (exceptionally and temporarily) 
the free movement of goods. 
The EEC Treaty’s main assumptions were thus rooted in the foundations of the Bretton Woods agreement: 
despite pooling together some competences, Member States retained the ability to autonomously design 
their most relevant policies –and among them, importantly, economic ones. Monetary stability, by 
guaranteeing a level playing field for all states, was a key factor in achieving this goal, turning exports into a 
key driver of economic growth. To that aim, cross-border payments (but not movements of capital) had to 
be possible. Potential imbalances were to be dealt with through loans, either by the IMF or the EEC, but in 
any case loans granted on the basis of compensating a systemic dysfunction rather than the misbehaviour 
of the assisted states, and thus not imposing hard conditionality on them. 
This collaborative spirit, based on the resilience of nation-states despite being engaged in the European 
integration process,7 was reflected at the institutional level in the principle of equality between Member 
States. Consequently, the EEC Treaty established a series of mechanisms that deactivated economic-based 
power relations between them. For instance, during the transitional period decisions in the Council were to 
be adopted unanimously and therefore Member States were equally represented therein. Moreover, 
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although after the end of the transitional period the Treaties foresaw that some Council decisions were to 
be adopted by qualified majority instead of unanimously, due to the Luxemburg compromise they were 
only approved if no Member State rejected the proposal, thus de facto observing unanimity and the 
principle of equality between states. The role of the Council was accordingly central in the EU institutional 
system, as the forum reflecting Member States’ equality. But the main flaw of this design, as would soon be 
proved, was that it was fundamentally dependent on the monetary stability provided by the Bretton 
Woods system. 
III.- The end of Bretton Woods: towards a new socio-economic model 
In 1971, urged by relentless inflation provoked by the escalation of the Vietnam War, US President Nixon 
unilaterally decided to cease the direct convertibility of the US dollar into gold.8 The immediate 
consequence was the collapse of the post-war international monetary order, furthered by the 
multiplication of turmoil all around the globe after the oil embargo by the OPEC countries and the 
subsequent economic recession. All these events represented extremely serious concerns for the EEC, since 
monetary instability and currency fluctuations had the potential not only to distort the common market but 
to jeopardize the smooth operation of the by then most successful achievement of European integration, 
namely the Common Agricultural Policy –based on a system of common price regimes.  
In the light of these circumstances the Member States adopted safeguard measures allowing 
implementation of specific controls in the event that a significant amount of capital flows occurred, 
especially those directed towards third countries.9 But these safeguards could not counteract the 
expectation of potentially huge profits made from currency oscillations. Furthermore, demand for financial 
services allowing companies and investors to hedge the risks associated with the structural growth of 
monetary and economic uncertainty spiralled out of control. Hence, the structural strength of financial 
markets in the international monetary setting soon revived.10 In this context, divergences between the 
different economic policies implemented in the Member States became relevant beyond the mere 
rhetorical domain for the first time. Under the conditions guaranteed by the Bretton Woods monetary 
order, Keynesian policies, promoting demand-side stimulus and associated with the control of capital flows, 
succeeded in combining growth with welfare policies. However, after the demise of the direct convertibility 
of the US dollar into gold, stability-oriented economic policies proved more effective. In particular, financial 
markets approved them because low inflation and a stable exchange rate guaranteed the value of 
investments and assets in the medium and long term, minimizing the risk of losses.  
Against that backdrop was established the European Monetary System (EMS), aiming at endogenously 
restoring monetary stability among the Members of the Community by means of containing currency 
fluctuations within certain limits.11 This implied the partial renunciation by Member States of their ability to 
determine the exchange rate of their currency, thereby curtailing the autonomy of their fiscal policies. The 
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Deutsche Mark soon became the de facto anchor currency of the system because the re-emerging financial 
markets favoured the German policy of a consistent fight against inflation, whereas Italy, France and 
Ireland experienced major balance of payments disequilibria.12 In the long run, the performance of the 
German and Dutch stability-oriented economies compared to the structural problems of the latter 
economies led to the unravelling of the Keynesian consensus on active macroeconomic policy playing a key 
role in stabilising the economy. Price stability gained support instead as the appropriate economic policy 
among economists and central bankers in Exchequers and Ministries of Finance. Thus was born what would 
be an extremely influential epistemic community of European central bankers.13 
The role of the international monetary institutions in the spread and general acceptance of economic 
policies based on price stability should not be neglected, though. As a consequence of the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods agreement the tasks and functions of the IMF and the World Bank were revised.14 
Instead of guaranteeing the convertibility of currencies in a system with exchange rates tied to gold, they 
were now to monitor national balances of payments in a regime of flexible exchange rates, making detailed 
policy proposals with economic stability in mind.15 But, on top of that, the financial assistance they 
continued to provide had to be conditioned for the first time on implementation of detailed policy 
programmes redressing balance of payments disequilibria and limiting external debt.16 In this regard price 
stability guaranteed suitable conditions for achieving economic stability in the long run. Assistance was thus 
no longer based on the correction of malfunctions inherent to the international monetary order but on the 
rectification of policies resulting from the misbehaviour of national political actors that have now to 
conduct economic policies according to the ‘good governance’ paradigm –a set of policies considered right 
that would lead to national economic stability in the current monetary regime.17 Therefore, against the 
original intention of the Bretton Woods agreements, power relations were reintroduced in the 
international monetary order through provision of conditional loans with increasingly intrusive provisions. 
The establishment of the EMS shielded Member States (although not completely) from these power 
relations. A growing respect among European politicians for the autonomy of monetary policy and its 
institutional corollary, central bank independence, stemmed from the Bundesbank’s actual performance. 
The result was the gradual disengagement of central banks from Treasury departments. Member States 
thereby transferred to monetary authorities their ability to decide on the purchase of sovereign bonds, 
now dependent on monetary instead of fiscal policy needs. Liberalisation of capital flows appeared then as 
an alternative source for public debt allocation, thus alleviating budget difficulties consequent on the 
increasing gap between national revenue and expenses.18 The unilateral liberalisation of capital movements 
adopted by the United Kingdom in October 1979,19 followed by a similar move by the Netherlands the next 
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year,20 opened the door to a change of debt relations in Europe: where initially public debt was mainly in 
the hands of national citizens and institutions, now foreign capital was holding those bonds to a greater 
extent than ever. Public debt thus became a source of external debt, linking Member States to private 
actors, mainly financial institutions, from other countries. The move towards a new regime of monetary 
policy detached from governmental control and accompanied by the acceptance of capital movements, 
with all the implications here described, was finally confirmed by the policy U-turn taken by the French 
Socialist government in 1983,21 leading to Bérégovoy’s franc fort policy.22 Therefore, by the time EMU was 
negotiated in the late 1980s, all actors, independently of their ideological background, not only agreed to 
liberalize capital movements23 but tended to be persuaded of the benefits of price stability,24 which became 
the core objective of monetary union.  
At this point the institutional system of the Communities was nevertheless safe from reflecting tensions 
resulting directly from debt relations, but this did not prevent them from permeating into the political 
arena. In this regard, the decisive role played by the Committee of Central Bank governors in the design of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1980s25 constituted a first avenue for debt-based power 
relations to gain influence in the EU institutional system. Less obviously but also rather decisively, the 
creation of the European Council, closely related to the monetary and economic crises of the early 1970s, 
was a major vehicle for institutional drift away from the principle of equality among states.26 Although the 
European Council gathers all heads of state and government as Masters of the Treaties and thus formally 
recognises equality among them (even more so since the basic features of the institution were included in 
the Treaties and its functions detailed therein), economic relations between states may have de facto 
affected political discussions. Indeed, since its inception the European Council has fostered asymmetric 
relations among states, not least on the basis of their different economic and financial might. 
IV.- The Treaty of Maastricht: laying the foundations of a new debt regime 
The Treaty of Maastricht designed not only the path towards but also the constitutional framework of 
EMU, which resulted in a rearrangement of the whole set of debt relations between EU Member States and 
between them and third countries. Unlike the original treaties, drafted in accordance with the context of 
monetary stability provided by the Bretton Woods agreement, the provisions designing EMU in the Treaty 
of Maastricht were not aimed at neutralising debt relations between Member States, but instead focused 
on the actual establishment and operation of a common currency. In terms of international debt relations, 
that was said to allow regaining of control over some of the key elements of debt. For instance, by making 
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the euro a currency of reference the EU could gain independence from other currencies, the US dollar in 
particular, as de Gaulle had wished as long ago as the 1960s.27 But the political narrative of the euro as a 
common goal overshadowed the internal debt relations that the concrete path chosen to achieve that aim 
would eventually entail. Moreover, because of the specifics of the interests involved in negotiating the 
Maastricht Treaty, a debt regime with potentially destructive consequences was established. 
As is well known, EMU is founded on an unprecedented asymmetry: Eurozone Member States share a 
common monetary policy coexisting with various national economic policies. The institutional design of 
EMU revolves around an independent central bank (the European Central Bank, ECB) with exclusive 
competence over monetary issues, leaving Member States responsibility over their national economic 
policies. Importantly, since Germany accepted introduction of a common currency before EMU was an 
optimal currency area28 (or at least a sufficiently integrated one), fiscal transfers between states or via 
Central Bank financing had to be ruled out in order to avoid adjustments at the expense of taxpayers from 
other Member States. Hence, they cannot assume financial responsibilities from any other Member State 
(the ‘no bailout’ provision, Article 125 TFEU).29 These transfers may also occur indirectly, via central bank 
financial support, but the latter is equally forbidden in order to guarantee monetary stability (Article 123 
TFEU). Consequently, by conferring monetary policy competences on the extremely independent ECB, 
Member States renounced the tools of currency devaluation and money creation to face balance of 
payments and sovereign bond repayment crises. Instead of that, the design of EMU forced them to rely on 
financial markets for financing. According to this logic, the markets would assess economic performance of 
each Member State and establish a specific risk premium when those states borrow money, allegedly 
contributing to discipline those more reluctant to adapt their economic policy to the requirements of 
EMU.30 A key element in this design is a broadening of the scope of free movement of capital, now allowing 
flows both to and from third countries31 and therefore strengthening the structural influence of financial 
markets. A direct consequence of the liberalisation erga omnes of capital flows was the increase of tax 
competition between Member States, which in order to attract mobile capital are forced either to establish 
a more regressive tax structure or to lose government revenues,32 thus aggravating their difficulties in 
balancing the accounts. Fiscal consolidation thus became a structural feature of EMU, likewise furthering 
the soundness of (national) economic policies required for price stability. Fiscal consolidation is therefore 
considered an instrumental objective of EMU and, as such, is promoted through institutional incentives: 
with their budgetary options constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and, especially, by 
subjecting their financing to capital markets, Member States have strong reasons to conduct responsible 
policies. In this regard, resort in the management of economic policies to a new set of arrangements 
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comprised under the ‘governance’ narrative (including benchmarking and peer reviewing) rather than to 
law, allowed new power-based relations between Member States to infiltrate the institutional setting.  
Evolution in this regard was gradual. With the Single European Act (1986) a move to voting rights 
proportional to Member States’ population followed a resolution to achieve the single market by the end of 
1992. Qualified majority voting became standard in matters conducive to that objective and, once 
achieved, in an increasing number of areas thanks to the Treaty of Maastricht. However, this did not lead so 
much to actual decision-making by qualified majority voting as to both the Commission and the Council 
(and the European Parliament as it acquired legislative powers) to work under the shadow of the possibility 
of decisions being taken by a qualified majority.33 Apart from this first relevant step moving away from the 
principle of equality among states, the new institutions set up to flesh out EMU were all informed by it. This 
was the case of the Eurogroup, an ad hoc institutional solution for the event that not all Member States of 
the Union became Members of the Eurozone, leading in practice to the emergence of a separate 
composition of the ECOFIN where only Eurozone Chancellors of the Exchequer and/or Ministers of Finance 
meet. This body lacks formal competence to adopt decisions, and thus functioned as a forum where issues 
of common concern were discussed before the actual ECOFIN meeting took place. It has been described as 
a genuinely deliberative body,34 or what is the same, as a body where political conflict between Member 
States would be downscaled.35 However, the fact that it was designed to be informal, in particular after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,36 makes it especially apt for power-based relations, because the 
lack of formal or procedural constraints gives free leeway to powerful states, whatever the source of that 
power is, to express their interests and ultimately to impose their views.  
A similar dual structure emerged in terms of monetary policy: together with the ECB, central banks from all 
Member States formed the European System of Central Banks, while the Eurosystem grouped the ECB with 
Eurozone central banks only. The difference with its counterpart on economic policy coordination is that 
the Eurosystem actually adopts decisions in its field of competence (monetary policy). More specifically, the 
decision-making body of the Eurosystem, the Governing Council, is composed of the six members of the 
Executive Board (elected between all Member States) and the governors of national central banks. Albeit 
this seems to alter the principle of equality among states, the technical and thus non-political character of 
the body allows it to work under a presumption of consensus –allegedly, members of the epistemic 
community will always agree on what is the correct decision in a given context.37 In other words, as long as 
the issues discussed in the Governing Council are of technical character, political discussions are discarded.  
Apart from guaranteeing the independence and well-functioning of the ECB, the main concern of the 
institutional framework designed in the Maastricht Treaty was to address the main structural weakness of 
EMU, namely that it relied on the will of national governments to conduct their economic policies in line 
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with common monetary policy in a constellation of interests promoting freeriding.38 However, far from 
contributing to the much aspired overall stability of EMU, the measures dealing with these misaligned 
incentives contained several hidden flaws that in the long run led to changes in the structure of economic 
relations between Member States. First, the limitation of national macroeconomic policies through the SGP 
was supposed to work similarly to negative integration in the internal market, but since EMU was based on 
governance arrangements rather than law,39 the control the CJEU could make was merely procedural.40 
Sanctioning of deviant behaviour depended on the discretion of the Council, which lacked political 
incentives when the country concerned was among the prominent economies.41 Second, once the common 
currency was established the effectiveness of markets in disciplining Member States diminished because 
the risk of devaluation disappeared. From then on, differences between sovereign bonds denominated in 
euros depended on their liquidity, with interest rate spreads remaining relatively low. It is true that a 
solvency risk remained, but the case of sovereign bankruptcy was considered a remote possibility.42 And 
third, focus on the development of national economic policies distracted attention from other 
macroeconomic indicators, in particular from massive capital flows from the centre to the periphery that, 
following the establishment of fixed parity of currencies and thus the elimination of all risks associated with 
exchange rates, led to substantial imbalances in their respective balances of payments.43 Ultimately the 
severe transnational implications of these capital flows directly affected the coming decision to force 
Greece to accept financial assistance instead of allowing it to default.44 
In sum, EMU created a common currency at the price of leaving its members without the ability to decide 
on their exchange rate, with no influence on decisions about the amount of money circulating in the 
economy (now a matter in the hands of the ECB), and with no mechanism of financial assistance should 
difficulties arise. But not only that, because through the complete liberalisation of capital movements the 
new regime gave financial markets structural power over its members. Neglect of the risks of imbalance 
represented by internal flows from the centre to the periphery, initially interpreted as a sign of 
convergence between EMU members, increased the potentially destructive effects of debt relations 
between Member States, a seed that finally germinated during the economic crisis. 
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V.- The great recession: the resurgence of debt relations within the European Union 
A new regime of debt relations took shape in the general context of the economic framework set up in the 
Maastricht Treaty, but resulting from a highly concrete decision that triggered a set of changes unfolding 
and spreading through different areas, and of such a foundational character that they have been labelled as 
‘constitutional mutations’.45 A combination of several causes, from continued excessive deficits and 
questionable statistical data46 to sustained tax evasion and, crucially, a pronounced current account deficit 
following massive capital inflows from other Member States, put Greece in a critical situation.  With the gap 
between reality and figures on public deficit being wider than expected, and without the possibility of 
autonomously devaluing its currency or increasing the amount of money in circulation, doubts arose about 
Greece’s ability to service its debt. Moreover, in the context of far-reaching financial turbulence triggered 
by the US sub-prime crisis, the markets radically changed their assessment and massively increased the risk 
premium on Greek bonds, thus blocking all its refinancing operations. The European Council was suddenly 
faced with the dilemma of either allowing the default of a Eurozone member, thus accepting that creditors 
(mostly European financial institutions) would assume their share of the losses and that the credibility and 
stability of the Euro in the international scene would be put into question, or granting financial aid to a 
bigger extent than in previous, non-Eurozone cases,47 against the rationale underpinning the constitutional 
design of EMU (and especially the ‘no bailout’ clause enshrined in Article 125 TFEU). It is common 
knowledge that the European Council opted for the latter. This decision triggered the unfolding of the debt 
crisis, forcing Eurozone Member States to borrow money from other Eurozone Member States, thus 
engaging in state-to-state debt relations. The apparent unconstitutionality of lending was said to be 
avoided by means of subjecting financial assistance to strict conditionality.48 The latter is what defines 
current debt relations in Europe: borrower Member States are forced to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) by which they commit to implementing a whole range of political and economic 
measures as consideration for the financial support necessary to overcome the fiscal crisis. These new debt 
relations are thus an expression of power, reflected in the conditions attached to MoUs (a short and 
medium term programme of economic and political reforms) and of the procedure according to which 
successive tranches of financial aid are actually paid (indeed, only after confirmation of compliance with 
conditions attached to the previous tranche, set by the creditors themselves).  
Combining the principle of national financial responsibility with the impossibility of default (affirmed 
against the letter of the law) implied that countries in financial need inevitably had to ask for financial 
assistance. As mentioned, this had to be subjected to strict conditionality, in order not to be considered a 
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fiscal transfer between Member States.49 Furthermore, it had to be accompanied by intensified monitoring 
of national economic policies from the supranational level, in order to remove the wrong incentives that 
institutionalisation of the different mechanisms of financial assistance50 entailed for national financial 
responsibility and the proper conduct of economic policies. This was achieved through an increase at the 
supranational level of monitoring, intervention and sanctioning powers over national economic policies, 
aptly named ‘reinforced economic governance’. The consequence of this new regime is a radical change in 
how national economies are supposed to converge. Instead of resorting to their coordination, they are now 
disciplined through a plethora of measures: increased supervision over, and if necessary correction of, 
Member States’ budgetary plans; reinforced monitoring procedures for macroeconomic indicators (balance 
of payments included); tightening of budgetary constraints (SGP); increase in the Commission’s 
investigative powers, to the point of allowing on-site inspections; or semi-automatic imposition of 
pecuniary sanctions in cases of excessive deficit, to name but a few. Ultimately, limitations on national 
budgets are transferred to other (mainly social) policy areas in the form of required expenditure cuts in 
order to achieve fiscal consolidation.  
The Greek financial position in 2010 highlighted that the solvency risk of Member States was not non-
existent but hidden in the EMU institutional setting, especially if they were to assume the debt of private 
institutions as if it was public debt. As soon as this was evident and financial difficulties spread, the 
continuation of the euro was at stake. The existential need to guarantee and safeguard the viability of the 
common currency led to a reinterpretation of the main (legal) principles of EMU, with financial stability 
replacing price stability as the cornerstone of the system.51 Importantly, as shown by the Greek episode, 
this had as an additional consequence the first clear discrepancy between the international monetary 
order, concerned about sustainability of external debts, and European institutions, for whom sustainability 
of Greek debt was subjected to the stability of the Euro area. In other words, conditionality in EMU is not 
related to the sustainability of national debt but to the stability of the euro. Accordingly, it has no limits 
regarding the scope and breadth of policy measures required, which can easily be perceived as punitive by 
the affected states.  
State-to-state debt dynamics in the context of EMU played a key role in triggering a constitutional mutation 
that extends to the institutional structure of the Union. The corollary is that in all new institutions equality 
among states has been replaced by the allocation of votes according to states’ (economic) power. It could 
be argued that this is not the case with one of the main institutional innovations resulting from the crisis, 
the Eurosummit, a reduced version of the European Council where only Eurozone heads of state and 
government sit. However, the deeply asymmetrical relationship between creditors and debtors has 
unleashed a new dynamic according to which states, instead of operating under the presumption of 
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consensus, have started to operate under the presumption of conflict.52 Hence, the grammar of deliberation 
has been replaced by the grammar of power, and informal institutions and gatherings where decision-
making is not regulated, such as the Eurosummit or the Eurogroup, have been easily pervaded by this new 
dynamic. Consequently, the interests of creditor and debtor states result in open conflicts, each position 
being straightforwardly identifiable with concrete heads of state or government at the Eurosummit or with 
ministers of economy and finance in the Eurogroup. The struggle between creditors and debtors is on the 
way to being transferred to the institutional system and, therefore, institutionalised.    
Paradigmatic illustration of this conflictual dynamic can be found in the revamped constitutional structure 
of economic policy, the so-called ‘reinforced economic governance’. With a view to ensuring fiscal 
discipline, it promotes the semi-automatic adoption of all sanctions proposed by the Commission. This was 
enabled through new, ad hoc voting rules deeming such a proposal to be adopted if the Council does not 
reject it by a qualified majority. A blocking minority can thus impede rejection by the Council or, reversing 
the terms, a minority can adopt those sanctions.53 These voting rules clearly benefit the interest of 
creditors, who are likely to gather the required number of votes. Whether the new rules will actually result 
in fiscal discipline being imposed by sanctions remains to be seen. Certainly an element of arbitrariness 
resulting from the need to assess whether the measures will actually help or undermine the fiscal position 
of the affected Member State seems to have informed the first decisions taken under the new rules.54  
With regard to the permanent fund for financial assistance, the intergovernmental European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), this has not escaped power conflict dynamics either. Not only because on its Board of 
Governors sit the Ministers of Finance of the Eurozone, thus replicating the composition and potentially the 
conflict dynamics of the Eurogroup, but also because voting rights therein are allocated according to the 
capital subscribed by each ESM member. This may in itself be regarded as the institutionalisation of 
economic power relations, but the asymmetries go well beyond that. Although all relevant decisions are to 
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be adopted by unanimity, there is a fundamental exception: a qualified majority of 85% of votes cast 
suffices if the Commission and the ECB consider that the financial stability of the whole euro area is at 
stake.55 As a result, the Member States with the biggest economies get a right to veto which others simply 
do not have.56 Finally, the ESM is a creature of international law, not of EU law. Consequently, it has its own 
by-laws, and even a court adjudicating on civil service matters regarding its own employees, although it is 
compelled to comply with EU law and the case law of the Court of Justice. This results in a serious risk of 
the ESM becoming the administrative arm of the creditor-dominated Eurogroup in matters pertaining to 
financial assistance.  
The internal dynamics of already established institutions have also changed in ways that favour creditors’ 
interests. This is clearly the case of the ECB and the voting rules in force since EMU became a 19-member 
club. According to the rotating voting system in force, state influence depends on capital subscribed (5/6) 
and the weight of the financial sector (1/6) of each Eurozone state. In practice, governors from the five 
largest Eurozone economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) vote four out of five times, 
while those from smaller economies vote eleven out of fourteen times. Inequality among states has been 
institutionalised, again reflecting (economic) power relations.57 However, precisely against the will of 
creditor countries, the ECB itself has become a creditor by adopting unorthodox monetary policy measures 
that have led to the acquisition of sizeable amounts of sovereign bonds, as well as by playing a key role in 
the so-called troika, monitoring implementation of MoUs in those states that have received financial 
assistance.58 What this entails in constitutional terms is perhaps best reflected in the letters addressed by 
the then ECB governor, Mr. Trichet, first to the Irish government, then to the Italian and Spanish 
governments, making rather extensive and significant requests in terms of national economic, fiscal and 
social policies. The constitutionalisation of the so-called golden fiscal rule, at least in Spain (plus the 
“absolute priority” of debt repayment over any other public expense),59 seems to be related to this 
epistolary relation.60 On top of that, the politicization of the ECB became manifest in the resignation of its 
chief economist, Jürgen Stark, motivated by his disagreement with the bond-buying programmes referred 
to above. Similar criticism of the ECB’s unorthodox monetary policy comes frequently from the German 
financial and monetary authorities.61 Whatever assessment one makes of these claims, it is clear that the 
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actual constitutional role of the ECB has been deeply distorted, to the point that it can be doubted what 
remains of its independence beyond the formalities.62 
In sum, post-crisis debt relations have unleashed a conflictual dynamic that has spread throughout the 
Union, transforming its institutional structures according to a creditor mind-set. This is clearly expressed by 
the turn in the inspiring principles underpinning the institutional system. Not only do new institutions 
respond to the (economic) power of the Member States, but even those well-established before the crisis, 
despite being legally informed by the principle of equality among members, have been pervaded by the 
current conflicting dynamics. In other words, creditors’ interests have now been institutionalised, to the 
point that dissenting opinions tend to be characterised as dangerous, because they may discredit the Union 
and thus undermine the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole. The (apparent) strengthening of 
fiscal discipline has come at the price of undermining the legitimacy of the Eurozone. 
VI.- Conclusions  
The evolution here described traces the changes in European integration resulting from debt relations. The 
original design of the treaties aimed at deactivating any kind of debt relation between Member States. 
Accordingly, monetary stability was guaranteed by the Bretton Woods agreement, within the framework of 
which Members of the Communities could adjust their exchange rate if needed. In addition, capital 
movements were under strict control, thus reducing the risk of balance of payments disequilibria, which 
even if they did occur could be addressed through multilateral loans subject to soft conditionality –tackling 
systemic malfunctions and therefore not imposing severe cutbacks on national economic policies.  
Several events have transformed this design and created the opportunity for debt relations to gain 
momentum. In this respect the collapse of the Bretton Woods system was crucial. The EMS, mimicking that 
system, imposed stricter constraints on national economies by pegging their currencies to the Deutsche 
Mark. Then unilateral liberalization of capital movements by the United Kingdom unleashed a new dynamic 
according to which all Member States were forced to do the same. When EMU was agreed and the 
common currency created, Member States renounced their exchange rate and the ability to create money 
through their central banks, thus severing their toolkit for facing imbalances and even economic crises. 
Simultaneously, foreign capital (especially intra-EMU, which avoided the risk associated with currency 
fluctuations) flooded peripheral economies and created a breeding ground for massive economic 
imbalances that radically turned into a debt crisis when the financial crisis reached European states and 
required transformation of private into public debt. The subsequent regime has adapted to these 
requirements and thus for the first time recognises state-to-state debt within European integration. 
The gradual evolution of debt relations between Member States explains how the power relations of which 
they are the source became more pronounced in the course of integration and ultimately resulted in radical 
tensions between creditor and debtor states (thus nourishing the sovereign rather than the integrated side 
of Member States63) and led in the end to their institutionalisation (and thus to transcending the principle 
of equality between states). Actual, direct and concrete debt relations between Eurozone Member States 
                                                          
62
  T. Beukers, ‘The New ECB and its Relationship with the Eurozone Member States: Between Central Bank 
Independence and Central Bank Intervention’, (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 1579-1620. 
63
  For some authors both are the two sides of the same coin (see the ‘constitutional synthesis theory’ in J. E. Fossum 
and A. J. Menéndez, The Constitution’s Gift: A Constitutional Theory for a Democratic European Union, Rowman & 
Littlefield, Lanham, 2011). After all, it seems that, depending on external factors, one side is more likely than the 
other to be on top after flipping that coin.  
are incompatible with the regulatory ideal of a union of equals. Consequently, European integration has 
been adapted to the new reality of debt relations. This is particularly evident in the role played by the 
Council in the institutional system: originally it was the central institution of the Communities, safeguarding 
equality between all Member States, but when after the Maastricht Treaty (and especially after the crisis) it 
gradually regained a dominant position,64 this time it did so reflecting power relations. Not only have 
decision-making processes been refashioned, locking in the power of creditors; less obviously but more 
pervasively, institutions have tended to internalise the interests of creditors. This is clearly evident in the 
role played by institutions monitoring the now strict conditionality of financial assistance. Indeed, creditor 
power is in the process of being entrenched in European and national law. This is at work in the ruling of 
the German Constitutional Court upholding the ESM Treaty provisions that de facto protect the right of the 
Bundestag to decide how to spend taxpayer’s money, but that simultaneously does not guarantee other 
national parliaments the same power.65 This entails that the German Constitutional Court is happy with a 
rule that has deeply asymmetric effects, and that makes the Union to which Germany belongs a union 
based on inequality (something that the Karlsruhe judges would be forced to reject were Germany a 
smaller and/or less economically powerful country).66 Double standards result from the peculiar 
legalisation of economic conflict dynamics. The renunciation of constitutional pluralism, illustrated by 
debates about expulsions from the EU, is but the other side of the coin. 
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